EXPLORE

VCFT1616LV

Hardening and Securing VMware Cloud Foundation

A Multi-Layered Approach

Bob PlankersSecurity & Compliance Engineer, Broadcom

#vmwareexplore #VCFT1616LV



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CIA Triad: Core Tenets of Information Security




Confidentiality

Protecting systems & data from unauthorized people & groups



Integrity

Preventing modification of data by unauthorized groups & systems




Availability

Ensuring that data is available to authorized parties when needed



Confidentiality



Every Feature is a Security Feature



EXPLORE

Introduction

Designing Hardened Systems

What is "Hardening?"

Designing Hardened Systems



Regulatory Compliance Requirements?

NIST Special Publication 800-53

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations

TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE

This publication is available free of charge from http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4

National Institute a Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

Table of Contents

UCTION LICABILITY. OTHER SECURITY CONTROL PUBLICATIONS RESPONSIBILITIES THIS SPECIAL PUBLICATION INDAMENTALS MANAGEMENT OL STRUCTURE OL BASELINES OL DESIGNATIONS CE PROVIDERS TRUSTWORTHINESS TENSIONS. ROCESS RITY CONTROL BASELINES INE SECURITY CONTROLS. E CONTROL SELECTION PROCESS NT AND LEGACY SYSTEMS .B-1 .C-1 Y CONTROL BASELINES - SUMMARY. ..D-1 ICE AND TRUSTWORTHINESS .E-1 CONTROL CATALOG. TION SECURITY PROGRAMS. FIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS. CONTROL CATALOG.

, and physical safeguards emplo ling of PII. 120 Organizations may se of PII, but may nevertheless re equally applicable to those ac ch risk when necessary.

appendix are based on the Fair Privacy Act of 1974, Section 20 and Budget (OMB) policies. Th s of organizations and to help o ivacy incidents. There are eight privacy families can be implem program, or information system nev Official for Privacy (SAOP ief Information Security Office others as appropriate. Table Jivacy control catalog.

J-1: SUMMARY OF PRIVACY CON

PRIVACY CONT

udit, and Risk Management rivacy Program Risk Assessment ents for Contractors and Service Prov and Auditing and Training

System Design and Development

and Retention onally Identifiable Information

ncil Privacy Committee issued a frame Jaments of a Federal Privacy Progre op an organization-wide privacy prog I in the United States and international mational laws and policies. In a number mining appropriate mitigation strategie so provided information and materials ments designate an SAOP/CPO as the for information privacy issues. OMB M term SAOP/CPO as used in this apper

rom organization to organization

Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4

Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems

classification boundaries. The Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) provides a baseline listing of approved cross-domain solutions

(21) INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT | PHYSICAL / LOGICAL SEPARATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS The information system separates information flows logically or physically using [Assignment: organization-defined mechanisms and/or techniques to accomplish [Assignment: organization-defined required separations by types of information].

Supplemental Guidance: Enforcing the separation of information flows by type can enhance protection by ensuring that information is not commingled while in transit and by enabling flow control by transmission paths perhaps not otherwise achievable. Types of separable information include, for example, inbound and outbound communications traffic, service requests and responses, and information of differing security categories.

The information system provides access from a single device to computing platforms, applications, or data residing on multiple different security domains, while preventing any information flow between the different security domains

Supplemental Guidance: The information system, for example, provides a desktop for users to access each connected security domain without providing any mechanisms to allow transfer of information between the different security domains

References: None

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-4 HIGH AC-4

AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES

Control: The organization:

- a. Separates [Assignment: organization-defined duties of individuals];
- b. Documents separation of duties of individuals; and
- c. Defines information system access authorizations to support separation of duties

Supplemental Guidance: Separation of duties addresses the potential for abuse of authorized privileges and helps to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without collusion. Separation of duties includes, for example: (i) dividing mission functions and information system support functions among different individuals and/or roles; (ii) conducting information system support functions with different individuals (e.g., system management, programming, configuration management, quality assurance and testing, and network security); and (iii) ensuring security personnel administering access control functions do not also administer audit functions. Related controls: AC-3, AC-6, PE-3, PE-4, PS-2.

Control Enhancements: None

References: None.

Priority and Baseline Allocation:

P1 LOW Not Selected MOD AC-5 HIGH AC-5

AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE

Control: The organization employs the principle of least privilege, allowing only authorized accesses for users (or processes acting on behalf of users) which are necessary to accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with organizational missions and business functions.

APPENDIX F-AC

PAGE F-18

PAGE xiii



RPO & RTO?
Encryption?
Access Requirements?
Ability to Grow?



CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

FY22 RISK AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS (RVA) RESULTS

MITRE ATT&CK™ TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

The percent noted for each technique represents the success rate for that technique across 121 RVA assessments.

Mitigations reference CISA Cyber Performance Goals (CPGs). CPGs are a prioritized subset of IT and OT cybersecurity practices aimed at meaningfully reducing risks. CPGs are applicable across all Critical Infrastructure sectors.





FY22 RVA Results

MITRE ATT&CK™ TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Initial Access

Threat actors attempt to obtain unauthorized initial access into a victim's network. Actors use techniques, such as valid accounts or spearphishing links, to gain this access. After obtaining initial access, actors can then execute other techniques to move about the network.

Mitigations

Organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this technique by adhering to the following Cyber Performance Goals (cisa.gov/cpg):

CPG 1.E Mitigating Known Vulnerabilities

CPG 2.A Changing Default Passwords


CPG 2.H Phishing-Resistant Multifactor Authentication

CPG 2.M Email Security

CPG 2.N Disable Macros by Default

CPG 2.W No Exploitable Services on the Internet





Maps Developer Monitor More...

SHODAN

Shodan

Explore

Pricing **☑**

ESXi

Q

Login

TOTAL RESULTS

19,411

TOP COUNTRIES



Brazil	2,280
China	2,270
United States	1,716
France	1,458
Germany	995

More...

₩ View Report

Product Spotlight: Free, Fast IP Lookups for Open Ports and Vulnerabilities using InternetDB

" + ID_EESX_Welcome + "

51.254.197.75 ns3044574.ip-51-25 4-197.eu

OVH SAS

France, Lille

eol-product

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Certificate Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 02:34:10 GMT

Connection: Keep-Alive Issued By: Content-Type: text/html |- Organization: VMware Installer X-Frame-Options: DENY

Issued To:

|- Common Name: ns3044574.ip-51-

VMware ESXi: 254-197.eu

Full Name: VMware ESXi 6.0.0 build-3620759

Content-Length: 5426

|- Organization: Name: VMware ESXi VMware, Inc

Version: 6.0.0

Build: 3620759 Supported SSL

OS Type: vmnix-x86 Versions:

TLSv1, TLSv1.1,

TLSv1.2

Product Line...

46.245.68.178

2023-08-03T03:50:48.592401

2023-08-03T02:34:10.805397

FY22 RVA Results

MITRE ATT&CK™ TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Persistence


Threat actors maintain persistence or foothold in a network or system by changing credentials or modifying configuration files to maintain continued access. Threat actors may also monitor and manipulate reports observed in the Server Manager Performance Monitor to remain undetected.

Mitigations

Organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this technique by adhering to the following Cyber Performance Goals (cisa.gov/cpg):

CPG 2.H Phishing-Resistant Multifactor Authentication CPG 2.T Log Collection





FY22 RVA Results

MITRE ATT&CK™ TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Privilege Escalation

Threat actors attempt to obtain escalated privileges to further compromise a network. Actors search systems for hard-coded or default credentials. When carrying out an attack, threat actors conduct extensive reconnaissance and credential harvesting to identify administrator accounts.

Mitigations


Organizations can mitigate the risks associated with this technique by adhering to the following Cyber Performance Goals (cisa.gov/cpg):

CPG 2.C Unique Credentials

CPG 2.L Secure Sensitive Data

CPG 3.A Detecting Relevant Threats and TTPs





Physical security?
Natural disasters?
Unique threats?



Requirements + Threats + Technical Controls + System Design

Designing Hardened Systems

Technical Controls

Advanced parameters & specific settings

Easy to set and check

Security Configuration Guide, DISA STIG & STIG Readiness Guides, CIS Benchmark

Most settings are secure by default

Very binary (pass or fail, no in-between)

All technical, no people & process work

VCF.noBreaches = TRUE



Requirements + Threats + Technical Controls + Design

Designing Hardened Systems

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Advanced parameters & specific settings

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Most settings are secure by default

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All technical, no people & process work

VCF.noBreaches = TRUE

System Design

Use features and functions to improve security

Not easy; needs to be done early

All organizations are different

Many features need to be enabled, because of...

Tradeoffs & "Compensating Controls"

Lots of people & process considerations

Where trust is established, or avoided



Requirements + Threats + Technical Controls + Design

Designing Hardened Systems

Technical Controls

VMkernel.boot.execInstalledOnly = TRUE

vMotion Encryption = REQUIRED

vSAN Data-in-Transit = TRUE

etc. etc. x156

Requirements + Threats + Technical Controls + Design

Designing Hardened Systems

Technical Controls

VMkernel.boot.execInstalledOnly = TRUE

vMotion Encryption = REQUIRED

vSAN Data-in-Transit = TRUE

etc. etc. x156

System Design

Do you have N+1 capacity so you can patch?

What key provider should you use?

How much performance change is there by enabling vSAN data-at-rest encryption?

What perimeter security controls do you have?

Secure Boot doesn't allow use of %firstboot

What do you mean the Domain Admins have access to VCF?

...and so on.



EXPLORE

System Design Concepts

Designing Hardened Systems

Regulatory compliance isn't security.

Compliance is always a negotiation.



Security always depends on context.




Security is always a tradeoff.

(Sometimes that tradeoff can be minimized, though)



"Zero Trust"





Desirable Characteristics of a Design

When I am working on a problem I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong.

-R. Buckminster Fuller

Cross-Reference These characteristics are related to general software-quality attributes. For details on general attributes, see Section 20.1, "Characteristics of Software Quality."

A high-quality design has several general characteristics. If you could achieve all these goals, your design would be very good indeed. Some goals contradict other goals, but that's the challenge of design—creating a good set of tradeoffs from competing objectives. Some characteristics of design quality are also characteristics of a good program: reliability, performance, and so on. Others are internal characteristics of the design.

Here's a list of internal design characteristics:

Minimal complexity The primary goal of design should be to minimize complexity for all the reasons just described. Avoid making "clever" designs. Clever designs are usually hard to understand. Instead make "simple" and "easy-to-understand" designs. If your design doesn't let you safely ignore most other parts of the program when you're immersed in one specific part, the design isn't doing its job.

Ease of maintenance Ease of maintenance means designing for the maintenance programmer. Continually imagine the questions a maintenance programmer would ask about the code you're writing. Think of the maintenance programmer as your audience, and then design the system to be self-explanatory.

Loose coupling Loose coupling means designing so that you hold connections among different parts of a program to a minimum. Use the principles of good abstractions in class interfaces, encapsulation, and information hiding to design classes with as few interconnections as possible. Minimal connectedness minimizes work during integration, testing, and maintenance.

Extensibility Extensibility means that you can enhance a system without causing violence to the underlying structure. You can change a piece of a system without affecting other pieces. The most likely changes cause the system the least trauma.

Reusability Reusability means designing the system so that you can reuse pieces of it in other systems.

High fan-in High fan-in refers to having a high number of classes that use a given class. High fan-in implies that a system has been designed to make good use of utility classes at the lower levels in the system.

Low-to-medium fan-out Low-to-medium fan-out means having a given class use a low-to-medium number of other classes. High fan-out (more than about seven) indicates that a class uses a large number of other classes and may therefore be overly complex. Researchers have found that the principle of low fan-out is beneficial whether you're considering the number of routines called from within a routine or the number of classes used within a class (Card and Glass 1990; Basili, Briand, and Melo 1996).

Portability Portability means designing the system so that you can easily move it to another environment.

Leanness Leanness means designing the system so that it has no extra parts (Wirth 1995, McConnell 1997). Voltaire said that a book is finished not when nothing more can be added but when nothing more can be taken away. In software, this is especially true because extra code has to be developed, reviewed, tested, and considered when the other code is modified. Future versions of the software must remain backward-compatible with the extra code. The fatal question is "It's easy, so what will we hurt by putting it in?"

Stratification Stratification means trying to keep the levels of decomposition stratified so that you can view the system at any single level and get a consistent view.
Design the system so that you can view it at one level without dipping into other levels.

Cross-Reference For more on working with old systems, see Section 24.5, "Refactoring Strategies." For example, if you're writing a modern system that has to use a lot of older, poorly designed code, write a layer of the new system that's responsible for interfacing with the old code. Design the layer so that it hides the poor quality of the old code, presenting a consistent set of services to the newer layers. Then have the rest of the system use those classes rather than the old code. The beneficial effects of stratified design in such a case are (1) it compartmentalizes the messiness of the bad code and (2) if you're ever allowed to jettison the old code or refactor it, you won't need to modify any new code except the interface layer.

Cross-Reference An especially valuable kind of standardization is the use of design patterns, which are discussed in "Look for Common Design Patterns" in Section 5.3. **Standard techniques** The more a system relies on exotic pieces, the more intimidating it will be for someone trying to understand it the first time. Try to give the whole system a familiar feeling by using standardized, common approaches.



Minimal complexity The primary goal of design should be to minimize complexity for all the reasons just described. Avoid making "clever" designs. Clever designs are usually hard to understand. Instead make "simple" and "easy-to-understand" designs. If your design doesn't let you safely ignore most other parts of the program when you're immersed in one specific part, the design isn't doing its job.


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
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EXPLORE


Physical Environment

Designing Hardened Systems













There is such a thing as too much security, though

(Fancy locks need power & network, for example)





EXPLORE

Server Hardware


Designing Hardened Systems

Secure Hardware Underneath Everything

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance




Management Controllers



VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance

1. Deactivate everything you are not actively using: IPMI, VNC, Redfish, IPv6, SSH, Telnet, Remote Admin/RACADM, SNMP, Serial-over-LAN...

- Deactivate everything you are not actively using: IPMI, VNC, Redfish, IPv6, SSH, Telnet, Remote Admin/RACADM, SNMP, Serial-over-LAN...
- 2. Deactivate the "OS Pass-through" or equivalent virtual NIC.



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- 2. Deactivate the "OS Pass-through" or equivalent virtual NIC.
- 3. Deactivate the USB configuration settings.

CMC

- Hardware

-Batteries

CPU

-Memory Front Panel

Network Devices

Removable Flash Media

USB Management Port

+ Storage

+ Host OS

USB Management Port

Configure USB Management Port

Enterprise



Support | Dell TechCenter | About | Logout










These settings impact the USB Management port. This port is located on the front of the server (indicated by the wrench icon). The port is capable of the following:

- iDRAC Management: Accessing the iDRAC Web interface from a laptop or tablet connected to the USB port (IP:169.254.0.3) or applying an XML configuration file directly from a USB key to the server.
- Using a standard USB key with the server's operating system.

For more information, see the Online Help.

Management USB Settings





Apply

CMC

- Hardware

+ Storage + Host OS

-Batteries CPU -Memory Front Panel Network Devices Removable Flash Media USB Management Port





Apply



Instructions

These settings impact the USB Management port. This port is located on the front of the server (indicated by the wrench icon). The port is capable of the following:

Enabled

- iDRAC Management: Accessing the iDRAC Web interface from a laptop or tablet connected to the USB port (IP:169.254.0.3) or applying an XML configuration file directly from a USB key to the server.
- Using a standard USB key with the server's operating system.

For more information, see the Online Help.

Enterprise

Value Attribute USB Management Port Mode Automatic ~ iDRAC Managed: USB XML Configuration Enabled only when the server has default c > USB Device Present Enabled only when the server has default credential settings

- Deactivate everything you are not actively using: IPMI, VNC, Redfish, IPv6, SSH, Telnet, Remote Admin/RACADM, SNMP, Serial-over-LAN...
- 2. Deactivate the "OS Pass-through" or equivalent virtual NIC.
- Deactivate the USB configuration settings.
- 4. Set NTP.

- Deactivate everything you are not actively using: IPMI, VNC, Redfish, IPv6, SSH, Telnet, Remote Admin/RACADM, SNMP, Serial-over-LAN...
- 2. Deactivate the "OS Pass-through" or equivalent virtual NIC.
- Deactivate the USB configuration settings.
- 4. Set NTP.
- 5. Set DNS.

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- 2. Deactivate the "OS Pass-through" or equivalent virtual NIC.
- Deactivate the USB configuration settings.
- 4. Set NTP.
- 5. Set DNS.
- 6. Forward logs to your syslog server, set up email alerts.

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- 7. Make good authentication choices (long passwords, vaulted).

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- 2. Deactivate the "OS Pass-through" or equivalent virtual NIC.
- Deactivate the USB configuration settings.
- 4. Set NTP.
- 5. Set DNS.
- 6. Forward logs to your syslog server, set up email alerts.
- 7. Make good authentication choices (long passwords, vaulted).
- 8. Configure front-panel LCD displays & buttons wisely.

Secure Hardware Underneath Everything

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance



Management Controllers



UEFI Firmware Settings

Legacy BIOS is deprecated in vSphere 8



Servers are NOT delivered with optimal firmware configurations for ESXi

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance

1. **UEFI Secure Boot**



- UEFI Secure Boot
- 2. Enable the Trusted Platform Module (SHA-256, TIS/FIFO)

Trusted Platform Module 2.0: Hardware

Not required, yet. It's inexpensive. Make sure it's in all new equipment.



- Secrets, slow random number generator, and permanent key as ID
- 2. Serial device that sits on the system board (think "modem" not fast)
- 3. Belongs to ESXi no workloads can touch it!
- 4. Stores encryption keys for ESXi Configuration Encryption
- 5. Doesn't help if your whole server is stolen
- 6. Easily cleared later



- UEFI Secure Boot
- 2. Enable the Trusted Platform Module (SHA-256, TIS/FIFO)
- 3. Enable Intel SGX or AMD SEV-ES

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- 6. Enable all the performance options that are shut off!

- UEFI Secure Boot
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- 3. Enable Intel SGX or AMD SEV-ES
- 4. Enable Intel TXT
- 5. USB only for keyboards, or deactivated.
- 6. Enable all the performance options that are shut off!
- 7. Let ESXi control the CPU power states.

Secure Hardware Underneath Everything



Management Controllers



UEFI Firmware Settings



Updating System Firmware

Being Flexible With Hardware

Future-Proof Your Ability to Change Quickly




EXPLORE

Isolation Techniques

Designing Hardened Systems

Isolation Decisions

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance





VLANs?

Separate NICs?

Isolation Decisions

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance





VLANs?

Firewalls?

Separate NICs?

ACLs?

VPNs?



Firewall

ADD EDIT DELETE REORDER

Thu 11-11-2021 06:01 AM UTC


Order	▼ Network Interface	▼ IP Address	▼ Action	Ψ
○ 1	nicO	192.168.1.0/24	Accept	
O 2	nicO	192.168.2.0/24	Accept	
○ 3	nicO	172.16.2.0/24	Accept	
O 4	nicO	172.16.3.0/24	Accept	
<u> </u>	nicO	172.16.9.11/32	Accept	
O 6	nicO	0.0.0.0/0	Reject	
				6 rules

Make sure you add "allow" rules before you add the any/any "deny" at the end!


NSX Distributed Firewall can be applied to nearly everything, except ESXi, vCenter, SDDC Manager, and NSX itself.

(But you can use NSX Edge for that)

Distributed Switch Traffic Filtering and Marking




More Like ACLs than a Modern Firewall



Isolation Decisions

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance



VLANs?

Separate NICs?



Firewalls?

ACLs?

VPNs?



Ingress?

Egress?



Q

Search Listings

帚

Service Descripti

Expose SSH ad



& Select Products

QSearch Products

vmware

- ✓ vSphere
 ∨SAN
 - App Volumes
- Cloud Director App Launch
- Cloud Director Object Stora
- Horizon
- **◯** NSX
- NSX Advanced Load Balance
- NSX Data Center for vSphe
- NSX Intelligence
- Site Recovery Manager
- Tanzu Kubernetes Grid
- Tanzu Mission Control

Protocols T Purpose T Destination **Ports** Product T Version ▼ Source T vSphere 8.0, 7.0 Supervisor Control 22 TCP vSphere -Management Workstations Dlane Management Tanzu

vspriere	6.0, 7.0	Workstations	Plane Management Network IP address	22	TCP	Tanzu	Control Plane \ Tanzu.
vSphere	8.0, 7.0	Management Workstations	Supervisor Control Plane Management Network IP address	80	TCP	vSphere - Tanzu	Expose HTTP aplugin-service download pag
vSphere	8.0, 7.0	Load Balancer Data Plane Interface	Supervisor Control Plane Cluster Network IP address	80	TCP	vSphere - Tanzu	Expose HTTP aplugin-service download pag
vSphere	8.0, 7.0	Management Workstations	Supervisor Control Plane Management Network IP address	443	TCP	vSphere - Tanzu	Expose HTTPS plugin-service download pag
vSphere	8.0, 7.0	Load Balancer Data Plane Interface	Supervisor Control Plane Cluster Network IP address	443	TCP	vSphere - Tanzu	Expose HTTPS plugin-service download pag
vSphere	8.0, 7.0	Load Balancer Data Plane Interface	Supervisor Control Plane Cluster Network IP address	5000	TCP	vSphere - Tanzu	Expose HTTPS plugin-service to internal Doc
vSphere	8.0, 7.0	Management Workstations	Supervisor Control Plane Management Network IP address	5000	TCP	vSphere - Tanzu	Expose HTTPS plugin-service to internal Doc


Isolation Decisions

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance



VLANs?

Separate NICs?



Firewalls?


ACLs?

VPNs?



Ingress?

Egress?



Routed?

Unrouted?

Should you put vCenter in/on the same network as ESXi management?



Common Security Zones in a Deployment, Ignoring Workloads



EXPLORE

Access Control

Designing Hardened Systems

Access Control is Everything



Access Control Includes Trust



Things Your Identity Provider Can Do To You

Not "Zero Trust" At All



Change Group Membership



Reset User Passwords



Disable MFA and Other Controls



Cover Their Tracks By Deleting Logs

Potential Designs for Authentication

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Local Authentication



Centralized Authentication




Dedicated Authentication

How Do You Reduce Trust?

Reduce Overall Trust, Not Require More





How Do You Reduce Trust?

Reduce Overall Trust, Not Require More







VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance

Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.

- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
- 2. If reasonable, do authorization inside vSphere/VCF, not inside your IdP.








- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
- 2. If reasonable, do authorization inside vSphere/VCF, not inside your IdP.
- Use Identity Federation to introduce MFA.

Options For Enterprise Identity Federation in VCF

VMware Identity Broker (VIDB)



PingFederate is also available in VMware vSphere

panacea

[pænəˈsiːə]

A panacea is a remedy, solution, or cure-all for all diseases, problems, or difficulties.



- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
- 2. If reasonable, do authorization inside vSphere/VCF, not inside your IdP.
- Use Identity Federation to introduce MFA.
- 4. Restrict access to vCenter Server to only those who absolutely need it.

vCenter Server is for vSphere Admins

(Workload admins should RDP or SSH into their workloads directly)



- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
- 2. If reasonable, do authorization inside vSphere/VCF, not inside your IdP.
- Use Identity Federation to introduce MFA.
- Restrict access to vCenter Server to only those who absolutely need it.
- 5. Severely restrict direct access to ESXi. Drive access through vCenter & RBAC model.

- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
- If reasonable, do authorization inside vSphere/VCF, not inside your IdP.
- Use Identity Federation to introduce MFA..
- 4. Restrict access to vCenter Server to only those who absolutely need it.
- 5. Severely restrict direct access to ESXi. Drive access through vCenter & RBAC model.
- 6. Also restrict access to other infrastructure systems' management interfaces.

- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
- 2. If reasonable, do authorization inside vSphere/VCF, not inside your IdP.
- 3. Use Identity Federation to introduce MFA...
- 4. Restrict access to vCenter Server to only those who absolutely need it.
- 5. Severely restrict direct access to ESXi. Drive access through vCenter & RBAC model.
- 6. Severely restrict access to other infrastructure systems' management interfaces, too.
- 7. Reduce permissions for service accounts to the minimum needed.

Know Exactly What Permissions Were Used

vSphere Privilege Recorder

Docs / VMware vSphere / vSphere Security Developer Center Using Privilege Recorder Add to Library S RSS Download PDF S Feedback Code Capture Overview API Explorer Updated on 06/08/2023 curl -X POST 'https://vcenter-1.8.fcotr.org/api/vcenter/authorization/privilege-checks?action=list' -H 'vmware-api-session-id: <valid-vapi-ses In vSphere, privileges are fine-grained access controls that can be grouped into roles and map them to users or of you identify the minimum set of privileges required to run a vCenter Server workflow. Response To run a specific set of operations, it is very difficult to determine the minimal set of privileges that are required by not have one-one mapping with the specific workflow which usually consists of multiple calls to different APIs opobject. As a result, the user either has more access or too little access to the environment. With the aim to keep VcenterAuthorizationPrivilegeChecksListResult (₹ ↓ { privilege recorder feature helps you identify the minimum set of privileges required to run a vCenter Server work "items": (Array<VcenterAuthorizationPrivilegeChecksInfo>, required) and query the privileges that were checked while performing an operation. Privilege recorder is implemented usi Note: This feature is available as an API, and it supports only workflows run by a script. There is no UI supports VcenterAuthorizationPrivilegeChecksInfo 🖺 🕹 { "object": (Object, required) Querying the ListAPI allows you to retrieve lists of privilege checks along with the corresponding sessions, users operation IDs (opIDs). You can use the appropriate filters to obtain privileges for a particular workflow. VapiStdDynamicID (domain-c8) 🖺 ↓ { For example, assume that user A needs to create a VM. Creating a VM requires a certain set of privileges. User A "id": (string, required) "domain-c8". from the system administrator. The system administrator can enable the privilege recorder and execute the creat "type": (string, required) "vim.ClusterComputeResource", privilege check is performed, the data for the privileges that were checked during the Create VM operation is sto PrivilegeID, sessionID, OpID, and so on. In this example, this system admin will use the filters to get privileges for system administrator can now create a role with minimum required privileges and assign it to the user. "principal": (Object) Enable Privilege Recorder using the vSphere Client You can enable privilege recorder by using vSphere Client or adding the configuration to vpxd.cfg. [Read more] VcenterAuthorizationPrivilegeChecksPrincipal (administrator) 🖰 🕹 { "domain": (string, required) "vsphere.local", Parent topic: vSphere Permissions and User Management Tasks "name": (string, required) "administrator",

"privilege": (string, required) "System Read".



- Isolate from corporate/enterprise IdPs.
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- Use Identity Federation to introduce MFA..
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- 8. Enable IdP advanced features like conditional access, geographic location, phishing-resistant MFA (number matching), and device hygiene.

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- 7. Reduce permissions for service accounts to the minimum needed.
- 8. Enable IdP advanced features like conditional access, geographic location, phishing-resistant MFA (number matching), and device hygiene.
- 9. Ensure access logs are being retained in your IdP, for as long as possible.


EXPLORE

Using Hardening Guidance

Designing Hardened Systems

"An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure"

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance



Easy to understand hardening guidance

Now includes vSAN services

Maps differences to STIG and PCI

New scripts to audit and remediate!


Implementation Priority Helps Admins Prioritize

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Do this first

Control does not have a secure default



Do this second

Control is secure but default could be better



Audit These


Default is secure but make sure it didn't change




Use Care

New and may have process or technology issues







< 2/2



Can you give me a PowerShell command that I can use to read all the .txt files in a directory called 'output' and then find lines in them with [FAIL], sorting them alphabetically?



Certainly! Here's a PowerShell command that you can use to achieve this:



```
Get-ChildItem -Path .\output\ -Filter *.txt | ForEach-Object {
Get-Content $_.FullName | Where-Object { $_-match '\[FAIL\]' }
} | Sort-Object | Out-Host
```

Explanation:


- 'Get-ChildItem -Path .\output\ -Filter *.txt`: This gets all `.txt` files from the
 'output' directory.
- 2. `ForEach-Object { ... } `: For each file found, the enclosed block will be executed.
- 3. `Get-Content \$_.FullName`: This reads the contents of each file.
- Where-Object { \$_-match '\[FAIL\]' }`: This filters the lines to only those containing `[FAIL]`.
- 5. 'Sort-Object': This sorts the results alphabetically.
- 6. 'Out-Host': Outputs the result to the console.

You can run the above command in your PowerShell terminal after navigating to the parent directory of the 'output' directory. It should display the sorted lines containing '[FAIL]' from all '.txt' files in the 'output' directory.



Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmark

VMware Cloud Foundation Security & Compliance




ESXi 8 synchronized with our guidance

CIS Benchmark for ESXi 7 left as-is due to adoption

Only for VMware ESX! Does not include other components!

US Department of Defense Guidance (DISA STIG)

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



Intended for use by US DoD and affiliates

Official STIGs come from public.cyber.mil

Readiness Guides are materials that have or will be submitted

Need STIG Viewer to view





EXPLORE

Wrapping Up

Designing Hardened Systems

Keep it simple; Complexity is our enemy

Don't tie things together unless you absolutely have to




"Baby steps"



https://bit.ly/vcf-security

Security & Compliance Resources for VMware Cloud Foundation



EXPLORE

Please take your survey.



EXPLORE

Thank you